| |||
|
Inconsistency with any cost-optimal pathwayNegative emissionsSuccessful action requires extremely large negative emissions (in order to make net emissions zero). No countries are developing negative emissions technologies. Not all countries would be able to deploy negative emissions.Diet and farming practicesThe strongest levers in the global calculator!Biomass – carbon accounting in the landscapeSome states are switching to bioenergy, but it has limited technical potential, it fights with food, and increasing bioenergy farming may well cause net carbon emissions.Climate change is a commons problemParis pretends to have solved the commons problem – but has not employed any of the lessons of the science of cooperation. Why will parties "raise their ambition" to the required level?PopulationBeware climate policies that incentivise population growth?Economic growth |
Inconsistency with any cost-optimal pathwayNegative emissionsDiet and farming practicesBiomass – carbon accounting in the landscapeClimate change is a commons problemPopulationEconomic growth |
Inconsistency with any cost-optimal pathway |
Negative emissionsSuccessful action requires extremely large negative emissions (in order to make net emissions zero). No countries are developing negative emissions technologies. Not all countries would be able to deploy negative emissions. |
Diet and farming practicesThe strongest levers in the global calculator! |
Biomass versus reforestation – carbon accounting in the landscapeSome states are switching to bioenergy, but it has limited technical potential, it fights with food, and increasing bioenergy farming may well cause net carbon emissions. |
Climate change is a commons problemParis pretends to have solved the commons problem – but has not employed any of the lessons of the science of cooperation. Why will parties "raise their ambition" to the required level? |
Nature, 12th October 2015 |
Summary of Cramton/Stoft/Ockenfels | ||
Negotiations can be designed to realign self-interests and promote cooperation. | ||
Reciprocity |
Individual commitments and reviews will not solve the tragedy of the commons. A common commitment ("I will if you will") can. | |
Negotiate Price | A global carbon-price commitment could yield a strong treaty, especially if coupled to Green Fund transfers, incentivizing low-emitting countries to support a high carbon price. |
|
PopulationBeware climate policies that incentivise population growth? |
Economic growth |
|
'Okay – it's agreed; we announce – "to do
nothing is not an option!" then we wait
and see how things pan out...'
Lowe, Private Eye |